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Purpose of review: The purpose of this review is to analyse whether collaborative marketing groups (CMGs) are an appropriate form 
to facilitate the marketing of products from smallholders in developing economies. It attempts to identify the conditions under which 
smallholder farmers will benefit from action to establish a collaborative group to market their products. 
Main findings: CMGs may be appropriate when there is a comparative advantage for the group over alternative marketing organisa-
tions and trust exists among the members of the group. A range of other enhancing factors (eg, the type of comparative advantage, the 
type of product, supporting organisations and resources) will influence the group’s chances of success and be instrumental in determin-
ing which type of CMG will be most appropriate. CMGs should not be used as instruments to implement government policy or to 
overcome the market failures that constrain rural development. 
Directions for future research: Further research is required to identify the relative importance of a range of factors identified as im-
portant to group success and into the roles and processes used to facilitate the development of CMGs. 
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Context for the marketing of smallholder prod-
ucts from developing countries 
In conducting a review based almost entirely upon articles 
published in the last five years, it is sometimes productive to 
go back in time to see if much has changed. In 1981, Lele 
[1**] suggested that “cooperatives have a universal appeal 
as an instrument of poverty alleviation and yet their record 
has been less than exemplary”. Is this still the case? Lele 
also suggested that with regard to marketing, credit and pro-
duction cooperatives, “in the absence of such prerequisites 
(internal and external), alternative forms of institutional 
arrangements may be as or more effective than cooperative 
institutions”. This warning is still relevant today and guides 
the discussion to follow. 
 
Over the last two decades, the global agrifood industry has 
changed dramatically as the market shifts from commodities 
towards differentiated and higher value-added products and 
the power retailers hold over their supply chains increase. 
The focus has shifted from competition between firms to 
competition between value chains. Value chains are increas-
ingly dominated by large international retailers who source 
products from suppliers around the world so that they can 
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deliver a consistent products all year around to their consum-
ers. These changes have necessitated greater vertical coordi-
nation [2] because of the need to deliver an increasing range 
of niche products with particular attributes [3], many of 
which depend on traceability or quality assurance processes 
along the chain. This has led to a decrease in the importance 
of spot markets in favour of more direct marketing arrange-
ments [2, 4–6]. Associated with this has been increased con-
centration in the food retailing sector and centralisation of 
buying by the larger retailers.  
 
While initially most of these changes occurred in developed 
countries, developing countries are becoming involved be-
cause of the increasing liberalisation of agricultural markets. 
Multilateral trade agreements signed under the auspices of 
the World Trade Organisation and bilateral trade agreements 
between countries have decreased trade barriers and in-
creased the potential for developing countries to compete in 
world markets. However, trade liberalisation has also opened 
up their domestic markets to competition from both higher 
quality producers and lower cost competitors.  
 
Although trade liberalisation has potentially created opportu-
nities for small farmers in developing countries, the increas-
ing emphasis on differentiated products and the vertical coor-
dination required to deliver these products has made it more 
difficult for smallholders to achieve market penetration. Two 
key issues are the characteristics of the small farmers them-
selves and the external environment in which they are em-
bedded. Small farmers in developing countries share a num-
ber of characteristics: very small-scale production, poverty, 
high levels of illiteracy, ill health, and low social and politi-
cal status and power [1, 7–9]. These constraints alone make it 
difficult for them to embrace the changes required for them 
to compete in a global market that requires high levels of 
management skills, sophisticated production technologies 
and economies of scale. Furthermore, the ability of farmers to 
access high value markets is constrained by additional exter-
nal factors such as: poor transport infrastructure leading to 
high transport and handling costs; expensive and limited ac-
cess to physical inputs, credit and information; inferior tech-
nology; high transaction costs (search, negotiation and con-
tract enforcement); problems of land tenure; law and order 
problems; and lack of government and institutional support. 
 
Small farmers in developing countries face a dilemma; trade 
liberalisation has created an opportunity for them to compete 
in high value markets, but their personal and environmental 
constraints make it almost impossible for them to compete. 
They can’t compete on their own because they are too small, 
which means they must collaborate to compete, otherwise 
they will continue to be marginalised. This raises the ques-
tion: in which situations and through what mechanisms are 
they most likely to succeed from collaboration? 
 
Purpose of review 
The purpose of this review is to determine whether collabora-
tive marketing groups (CMGs) are an appropriate form to 
facilitate the marketing and distribution of products from 
smallholders in developing economies. It will try to answer 
the question: under which conditions will farmers benefit 
from action to establish a collaborative group to market their 
products? The focus will be on looking forward to create new 
groups rather that looking back at ways of re-organising old 
collaborative or cooperative groups as is the focus of much of 
the literature in industrialised countries. 
 
A CMG is a group of farmers who have organised to collec-
tively market their produce. This is a broad definition that 
includes other structures such as cooperatives, growers asso-
ciations (GAs) or partnerships, but its structure may be less 
formally organised than these groupings. However, much of 
the review will discuss the features of cooperatives since this 
grouping is the most common form of CMG.  
 
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) defines a coop-
erative as “an autonomous association of persons united vol-
untarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural 
needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democrati-
cally-controlled enterprise” [10]. More specifically, market-
ing cooperatives (MCs) “buy the agricultural produce of their 
members and distribute it to the final market, usually after 
processing the product” [11]. Another cooperative form of 
CMG that does not involve purchase of the product is a bar-
gaining cooperative (BC) or GA. A BC “is a horizontal ar-
rangement between a collection of farmers … to bargain with 
wholesalers (and sometimes retailers) on behalf of mem-
bers” [4, p. 255–256]. While it may undertake other activities 
such as quality control, sorting and packaging, it does not 
take ownership of the product. 
 
The review consists of four sections: reasons for the forma-
tion of CMGs; possible reasons for the successes and failures 
of CMGs in developing countries; developments in the the-
ory of CMGs; and implications for the conditions in which 
small farmers in developing countries might benefit from 
establishing a CMG. 
 
Reasons for formation of collaborative market-
ing groups 
The first modern cooperative was established by a group of 
English weavers from Rochdale in 1844 so that they could 
buy cheaper food. Since then, the seven principles that define 
a cooperative and its values in contrast to an investor owned 
firm (IOF) have been established as [10]: voluntary and open 
membership; democratic member control; member economic 
participation; autonomy and independence; education train-
ing and information; cooperation among cooperatives; and 
concern for community. Cooperatives and CMGs do not nec-
essarily follow all these principles, however, the key differ-
ences that distinguish their structure from that of IOFs is that 
members have two roles in the organisation [12]: as patrons 
(ie, selling or marketing through the cooperative) and as in-
vestors (ie, the major source of investment funds). Inherently 
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these two roles are the source of both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of CMGs. Traditionally, cooperatives have been 
established for defensive reasons, but other reasons include 
taking advantage of government policies and for offensive 
reasons. 
 
Increase bargaining power – defensive reasons 
The defensive reason for establishing cooperatives is an at-
tempt to increase bargaining power in a situation of market 
failure arising from ex ante market power (monopsony or oli-
gopoly), ex post market power (“hold-up” or “lock-in”) and 
asymmetric information [9, 11–13]. Henriksen [14] used the 
theory of industrial organisation to examine the reasons for the 
success of cooperative creameries in Denmark at the end of the 
19th century. The key findings were that given the technology 
of the time, cooperatives were ideally suited to overcoming the 
problems of potential lock-in and asymmetric information. 
Potential “lock-in” or “hold-up” for a farmer is the situation 
where the farmer has invested in substantial transaction-
specific investments to produce a normally perishable com-
modity, which they are then required to sell to a monopsonist 
downstream intermediary or processor [12–15]. In this situa-
tion, farmers fear they will be “held up” during the negotia-
tion process and form cooperatives to overcome this problem. 
As implied by the Danish creameries case, the need to form a 
CMG is normally associated with an asymmetric information 
problem in which the downstream intermediary has much bet-
ter information than the farmer about the costs and quality of 
the service they are providing [14]. In the modern market, ac-
cess to the consumer and information about their ever-
changing tastes and preferences has enabled retailers to estab-
lish a similar position in the market place. 
 
In the case of down-stream processing, an additional driver is 
that there are often considerable scope and scale economies. 
These factors encourage farmers to move beyond simple BCs 
to take advantage of the economic rents associated with proc-
essing [11, 13]. Economies of scale and asset specificity are 
key reasons behind the importance of cooperatives in the 
dairy processing industry. 
 
Take advantage of taxation and other support offered by 
government 
Other authors [11, 12, 16, 17] have pointed out that in both 
developed and developing countries, cooperatives have been 
formed to take advantage of government programs, either 
because the government has provided legal and taxation ad-
vantages for the establishment of cooperatives, or because the 
government has promoted, supported and often run coopera-
tives as part of their development programs. 
 
“Entrepreneurial cooperatives” – offensive reasons 
Nilson [12] applies the term “entrepreneurial cooperative” to 
situations where both the patron and investor role are impor-
tant to members of a cooperative. Cook and Plunkett [13] 
use the term “collective entrepreneurship” to describe the 
“rent-seeking behaviour exhibited by formal groups of indi-
vidual agricultural producers that combine the institutional 
frameworks of investor-driven shareholder firms and patron-
driven forms of collective action” (p. 421). The traditional 
structure of cooperatives has led to a focus on the patron 
role, often to the detriment of the investor role [12]. The 
changes to cooperative structures arising from the New  
Institutional Economics (NIEs) critiques have led to a 
greater focus on the investor role. New Generation  
cooperatives and related types are making investments in 
processing and marketing that aim to make them more effi-
cient than other types of firms and hence to generate Ricar-
dian rents [13]. A farmer member of these cooperatives is 
therefore able to obtain benefits as a patron and as an inves-
tor. 
 
Possible reasons for the successes and failures of 
collaborative ventures for smallholders in devel-
oping countries 
The performance of cooperatives in developing countries 
“has been less than exemplary” [1]. Lele suggests the reasons 
for this include: a lack of understanding of the actual con-
straints and solutions facing the poor and consequently coop-
eratives may not be the best solution; insufficient emphasis 
on internal prerequisites of leadership, management, experi-
ence and technical know-how; and lack of external prerequi-
sites for effective functioning of organisations such as gov-
ernment policies on agricultural pricing, input distribution, 
infrastructure development and regulatory functions. The 
reasons for the successes and failures of cooperatives in de-
veloping countries have been widely documented, but the 
focus of this section will be on recent insights.  
 
Success stories 
Despite the impediments, there are several success stories of 
cooperatives in developing countries. Raju [18] discusses the 
example of the Anand dairy cooperatives in India. A World 
Bank audit demonstrated that the initial investment showed a 
1,200-fold return over a period of 10 years. Raju suggests 
that the scheme had a major impact on the economic viability 
of farmers, which led to dairying becoming the major source 
of employment and income generation, significant improve-
ments in dairy processing and culminated in an assured sup-
ply of dairy products to consumers. The key lessons arising 
from the scheme were: 
• Subsistence producers must have easy, low cost access 
to remunerative market opportunities; 
• Begin by developing a successful marketing strategy 
before organising the producers; 
• Design the cooperatives and facilities so they can match 
supply and demand; 
• External resource support is needed for pump priming; 
• Establish a distinctive competitive advantage; and 
• Have professional managers who involve the members. 
 
However, what ultimately emerged was a hierarchy of coop-
eratives, leading to centralisation and a lack of unifying iden-
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tity. As a consequence, Raju suggests that the federal coop-
erative structures that emerged became inefficient and un-
profitable, becoming a drain on the milk producer members. 
The problem in this context was to find a federal structure 
that overcomes the weaknesses that developed. 
 
On a smaller scale, Holloway et al. [19] report on the emer-
gence of collaborative sales organisations amongst peri-urban 
milk producers in the Ethiopian highlands who supply milk. 
These organisations are producing benefits for their mem-
bers, but they conclude that a mix of other inputs is required 
if these groups are to develop into more sophisticated and 
widespread cooperative organisations. One input that had a 
positive effect was visits by extension personnel. 
 
Another area where cooperatives are achieving some success 
(although this is not universal) is in connection with the mar-
keting of Fairtrade coffee and to a lesser extent organic coffee. 
Fairtrade coffee is marketed under certification from Fairtrade 
organisations. They set a minimum price for coffee and if the 
world price reaches that price they provide a small premium 
over the world price [11]. Over the last 10 years, world prices 
have been consistently below the minimum price. Licensed 
Fairtrade roasters or traders have to fulfil a list of conditions 
including working through a democratically organised pro-
ducer cooperative. While the numbers of coffee farmers bene-
fiting from the program are relatively few [11], there is evi-
dence to suggest that it is having a positive effect in some 
countries such as Nicaragua [16, 20]. Economic improvement 
occurs through improved prices arising from a higher base 
price and improved quality which is part of the program. 
However, there is also evidence [16] that the associated train-
ing and social capital building associated with the cooperative 
movement is having a positive effect on development. Other 
certification schemes that work through cooperatives, such as 
organic, are also providing some benefits [21]. 
 
While such certification schemes provide an advantage to 
farmer cooperatives, it does not appear to guarantee success 
[16]. In Tanzania, the benefits appear to be less than they are 
in Nicaragua and this is attributed to the contextual factors 
such as the large size of the Tanzanian cooperative federa-
tions which lead to a limited sense of ownership. This sense 
of ownership and associated communication mechanisms are 
important for improving the quality of the coffee, which is 
essential if producers are to maintain a higher price [16]. 
There is also evidence to suggest that organising farmers into 
a cooperative with the help of an outside advisor and obtain-
ing Fairtrade or organic certification will not be successful 
without genuine participation and commitment from farmers 
[16, 21]. An existing culture of cooperation and trust in the 
farming community also appear to be beneficial [11, 20, 21]. 
Nevertheless, authors [16, 20, 21] have criticised the imposi-
tion of these certification schemes’ from above (eg, organic, 
Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and Starbucks), in contrast 
with the requirement for participatory decision making by 
farmer organisations. 
Reasons behind poor performance 
Historically, in developed countries, cooperatives were 
formed and were most successful where there was a good 
defensive justification for forming a cooperative to increase 
bargaining power in situations of market failure and asym-
metric information. While this has also been the primary jus-
tification for the formation of cooperatives in developing 
countries, the reality has often been different [1, 11], with 
market intermediaries being blamed for low prices when 
other reasons such a poor infrastructure are the major cause. 
Without this comparative advantage over the alternatives, 
cooperatives will struggle in any environment. 
 
Similarly, their chances of success (and the chances of suc-
cess for other organisation forms) have decreased due to lack 
of external prerequisites. These include: a legal and institu-
tional environment to support cooperatives [3, 8, 9]; physical 
infrastructure such as roads and telecommunication facilities 
[3, 7, 9, 11, 19]; access to inputs such as seed, fertiliser and 
chemicals [3, 9, 22]; social services such as education, health 
and housing [3, 9, 11, 19, 22]; access to credit [7, 8, 22]; and 
support from extension services on technical and cooperative 
management issues [3, 9, 22]. Perversely, the lack of many of 
these factors creates a demand from members for their coop-
eratives to address them [22]. If they do, it leads to greater 
complexity for management and control and a lower prob-
ability of success [11]. 
 
Internal factors have also been important in influencing the 
sustainability of collaborative groups. A key factor has been 
trust [7, 11, 20]. Trust in a community can also relate to the 
social homogeneity of the community, with greater levels of 
homogeneity and trust having a positive effect on collective 
effort [8]. Members of a CMG need to trust their organisation 
and its management and leaders [8, 23–25]. This leads to lower 
transaction costs and is what provides the collaborative group 
with an advantage over other forms of organisation. This issue 
overlaps with the size of the cooperative, as the larger the 
CMG, the more heterogeneous the membership and the lower 
the commitment to cooperation [16]. Vertical integration and 
the amalgamation of cooperatives can have a similar detrimen-
tal effect on trust and commitment [16–18]. 
 
One of the key cooperative principles is autonomy and inde-
pendence and there is considerable evidence that in many 
developing countries, cooperatives have become dependent 
on government, are creatures of government policy, or have 
become subject to political interference [11, 16, 17, 21, 26, 
27]. Government support can be both a help and hindrance. 
While the support remains, the cooperative continues, but 
once the support is removed, the cooperative is likely to col-
lapse [11, 17]. This also applies to support from NGOs. Too 
much support creates dependency leading to lower levels of 
motivation and trust in members and internal leaders [7, 11]. 
 
Holding management accountable to the members continues 
to be an issue for CMGs in developing countries [1, 7, 9]. 
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This arises because the democratic structure of CMGs makes 
it more difficult to control the managers, but illiterate farmers 
also lack the skills to adequately supervise the activities of 
professional managers. If local rather than professional man-
agers are used, their lack of education and management ex-
pertise will also be a problem. In addition, many developing 
countries don’t have a culture of democracy so farmers have 
little experience with it. 
 
Developments in the theory of collaborative 
groups and cooperatives 
The key difference between CMGs and IOFs is that farmers 
are both the patrons and the investors in many CMGs, 
whereas they are only the patrons of IOFs. The implications 
of the dual role for efficiency and effectiveness of CMGs and 
how they are structured with respect to the two roles has been 
the focus of much research over the past decade, particularly 
on cooperatives in the developed countries. Much of the 
work has used NIE theories including transaction cost eco-
nomics, agency theory and property rights theory as the 
framework for the analysis. A detailed discussion of these 
theories can be found in an article by Cook et al. [28]. In this 
section, only a very brief summary will be provided of the 
issues arising from this analysis including: investment prob-
lems, governance problems, differentiated market problems, 
asset specificity and organisational culture. 
 
Investment problems in cooperatives 
Traditional cooperatives have focussed on the patron role of 
the member because they were designed to correct market 
failure, but this has suppressed the investor role [12]. Their 
structure leads to a free rider or common property problem, 
which arises because new members pay a small fee to join 
the cooperative and receive the same rights as long-term 
members [3, 9, 12]. Similarly, the member cannot take ad-
vantage of capital growth when they leave. Consequently, 
there is little incentive for members to invest and when capi-
tal is needed for growth, there is a preference for borrowed 
capital. Since most benefits members receive are based on 
their level of patronage, there is little incentive for members 
to invest in the longer term, which leads to what is known as 
the horizon problem [3, 9, 12]. A third issue is the portfolio 
problem, which arises because of the diversity of interests 
between members and between members and managers, 
which means it is not possible to make investment decisions 
optimal with respect to their preferences [9, 12]. This leads to 
economic inefficiency. In combination, these problems lead 
to difficulties in raising capital both from members and from 
banks, which can stifle growth and produce suboptimal 
choices between investment options. Agricultural coopera-
tives are often constrained in their capital expenditures by the 
availability of internal funds and that this is correlated with 
their structural characteristics [29]. 
 
Governance problems 
Governance problems arise because of the need for the board 
of a cooperative to supervise management and to protect the 
interests of members and stakeholders. Some of the issues 
here are control, cost and decision-making problems. Control 
problems arising from the relationship between a traditional 
cooperative’s board and its management are principal-agent 
situations, because there is no market for equity shares which 
provides a guide to the manager about future profits [3]. This 
also means that the board cannot provide equity incentive 
schemes for managers [9, 11]. Since the investor role is sup-
pressed in traditional cooperatives, it is more difficult to pro-
vide the appropriate direction for managers since members 
obtain most of their benefits through patronage, resulting in a 
short-term focus rather than the long-term focus required for 
growth and efficiency. The members of the cooperative board 
therefore have to spend more time monitoring the affairs of 
the managers, yet, since the board is made up of elected 
farmer members, they often don’t have the experience or 
skills to make these decisions [3]. 
 
Cost and decision-making problems increase with the size 
and the heterogeneity of a traditional cooperative [9]. Since 
the members of the board are elected to serve the interests of 
the members and members receive their benefits mainly 
through their patronage (rather than through profits and in-
creased share price as in IOFs), there is greater potential for 
conflict over objectives, strategies, pricing policies and in-
vestments [3, 9, 11]. Members, the board and management 
may spend considerable time and cost attempting to resolve 
these issues, which can lead to greater complexity and diffi-
culty in decision making and a decreased focus on efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
 
Cornforth [30] introduced a multi-paradigm paradox perspec-
tive that incorporates a number of theoretical perspectives to 
highlight the paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions that boards 
face in governing cooperatives. The paper combines: a de-
mocratic or association perspective, agency theory, steward-
ship theory, resource dependency theory, stakeholder theory 
and managerial hegemony theory to highlight the tensions for 
boards between: representative and expert boards, confor-
mance and performance, and controlling and supporting. It 
calls for the board and managers to have discussions and ne-
gotiations about the roles and responsibilities of each in light 
of these tensions and paradoxes. 
 
New models of cooperation 
As a result of the investment and governance problems asso-
ciated with the traditional cooperative structure, many exist-
ing cooperatives have chosen to convert to IOFs, while new 
and existing cooperatives have adopted alternative structures. 
Various typologies have been developed to categorise these 
structures [12, 31, 32]. Nilsson [12] uses a simple model 
based on the two dimensions of members’ involvement in 
their patron role and members’ involvement in their investor 
role to derive four extreme types. Traditional cooperatives, in 
which the patron role overshadows the investor role, are suc-
cessful if they continue to counteract market failure. They 
have minor property rights problems. Entrepreneurial coop-
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eratives, in which members are highly involved in their pa-
tron and investor roles, may also counteract market failure 
and have minor property right problems. This is consistent 
with the “offensive” cooperative or collective entrepreneur-
ship concept in which group action is taken to achieve Ricar-
dian and monopoly rents [13]. Degenerated cooperatives, in 
which members have little involvement in the patron or the 
investor role, are characterised by little capacity to correct 
market failure and have substantial property rights problems. 
This type of cooperative is large with many areas of opera-
tion; its membership has become heterogeneous and remote 
from the firm and it faces collapse. Ex-cooperatives are often 
former degenerated cooperatives that have converted to in-
vestor-owned firms. Based on this analysis, the only ineffi-
cient form is found to be the degenerated form with its 
vaguely defined property rights, sizeable unallocated capital 
and little capacity or opportunity to correct market failures, 
which leads to minimal involvement and trust of members. 
 
Another typology is based on an ownership rights perspective 
[31, 32]. This typology makes the distinction between models 
based on whether ownership rights are restricted to member-
patrons or not. The ends of the two branches based on this 
distinction are traditional cooperatives (membership re-
stricted) and IOFs (membership not restricted). The other 
forms for the non restricted type are: 
• Cooperative with capital seeking entities – investors 
have ownership rights in separate identity owned or 
partly owned by the cooperative; and 
• Investor-share cooperative – investors receive ownership 
rights in the cooperative in addition to ownership rights 
of member-patrons. 
 
Along the restricted ownership rights branch are: 
• New Generation cooperatives – ownership rights are 
tradable and appreciable delivery rights; 
• Member-investor cooperatives – returns are distributed 
in proportion to shareholding in addition to patronage; 
• Proportional investment cooperatives – ownership rights 
are non-transferable, nonappreciable and redeemable, but 
members are expected to invest in proportion to patron-
age; and 
• Traditional cooperatives – residual return rights are non-
transferable, nonappreciable and redeemable. User bene-
fits are distributed in proportion to patronage, but invest-
ment may not be proportional to patronage. 
 
This typology focuses on the changes being undertaken by 
cooperatives to overcome the capital constraint identified as a 
problem in the traditional cooperative structure [31, 32]. 
However, these tradeoffs of ownership rights for equity capi-
tal may lead to new organisational costs [32], partly related to 
increased transaction costs [22]. 
 
Another trend identified is the emergence of BCs or GAs be-
cause of the perceived inefficiency of traditional cooperatives 
to provide differentiated products [4, 15, 33]. These developed 
in the Netherlands in response to the demand for high-quality 
products in customer-specific packaging, a situation in which 
the auction system, organised through a grower-owned coop-
erative, was not effective [4]. This is consistent with Skyuta 
and Cook’s analysis [33], which suggests that open-
membership cooperatives are less likely to reward members 
for product-specific investments. These growers associations 
[GAs] are organised for one particular crop or crop variety 
with the objective of improving bargaining power [4]. Most 
are small, use a democratic voting system and all members are 
treated equally in the distribution of revenues and delivery of 
output. This means that within a particular quality class, each 
grower receives the same price. A theoretical model is used to 
analyse the trade-offs between self-selection and countervail-
ing power in the formation of these associations. Its key find-
ings are that heterogeneous GAs provide strong countervailing 
power, but can frustrate high-quality growers, while homoge-
neous GAs succeed in markets that provide significant premi-
ums for differentiated product or when low-quality growers are 
driven out [4]. 
 
Other findings 
Using transaction cost analysis, MCs are predicted to be an 
efficient organisational form provided that the level of asset 
specificity at the processing stage is relatively low or imme-
diate when compared with the farm-level asset specificity 
[15]. Conversely, they will become less efficient as the level 
of asset specificity at the processing level increases. 
 
Trust is an important issue for cooperative success [7, 9, 11]. 
A survey of Missouri corn and soybean farmers [24] found 
that trust was significant in explaining the choice to market to 
MCs rather than IOFs. Farmers also had higher levels of trust 
and perceptions of honesty and competence in MCs than 
IOFs. However, James and Sykuta [23] note that greater em-
phasis on investor incentives may decrease trust in the coop-
erative because of its effect on perceptions of equality among 
group members. 
 
Similarly, a study of Dutch cooperatives [34] supports the 
hypothesis that democratic voting systems were better than 
variable voting systems in their effect on performance. The 
caveat here is that the membership of the cooperatives stud-
ied was fairly homogeneous. Individualised ownership struc-
tures which overcome some of the property rights problems 
associated with traditional cooperatives were found to en-
hance performance, which is further evidence of the effect 
this has on the ability of cooperatives to raise capital. Differ-
ential pricing policies were found to have a positive effect on 
market orientation but not on performance. Most interesting 
was that cooperative structure seemed to be less important in 
predicting market orientation and performance than entrepre-
neurial firm culture, suggesting that it is more important for 
cooperatives to create conditions to enhance this. 
 
There has been a recent trend for New Generation coopera-
tives in the USA to be taken over or converted to IOFs [35]. 
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Part of the problem relates to the “thin” market for their stock. 
Using analyses of investment thresholds and takeover regions, 
Holland and King conclude that a competitive auction mecha-
nism may be a good option to improve the liquidity of mar-
kets for new generation stock and hence make them easier to 
form and less vulnerable to takeover. Other options such as 
opening investment opportunities to non farmers are dis-
cussed, but it is considered that this might weaken the strong 
link between ownership and use, which is their key advantage. 
 
Should a CMG be established? 
Two factors appear to be critical to the successful establish-
ment of a CMG [11]: 
• A comparative advantage for the establishment of a 
CMG generally arising from a market failure; and 
• A reasonable level of trust amongst the members of the 
community seeking to establish the CMG. 
 
Without a comparative advantage over the alternative forms 
of marketing, CMGs are doomed to fail because of the inher-
ent weaknesses that may make them less efficient than the 
alternatives. Success is unlikely unless the group provides 
strong personal incentives for the members to remain with 
the group [7]. Situations in which CMGs may have an advan-
tage are when farmers are dealing with monopsony or oli-
gopsony situations; when farmers are making high levels of 
transaction-specific investments; when there are substantial 
economies of size associated with processing; when market-
ing services are not provided by the private sector; and when 
a cooperative has an advantage in receiving access to higher-
priced markets (eg, Fairtrade). 
 
A mistake is often made by many farmers, development 
workers and NGOs when they blame market intermediaries 
for problems and inefficiencies with the market and assume 
they are inefficient or colluding [1, 11]. Instead, the problems 
often arise from a range of external factors such as poor in-
frastructure, information and market signals. The solution in 
these cases is to fix these problems, because the existing sys-
tems have developed to deal with the constraints and a CMG 
will still have to deal with the same problems. Therefore, a 
detailed investigation is required of the causes of market fail-
ure before considering whether a CMG is the solution.  
 
Trust appears to be the glue which allows a CMG to compete 
with other organisational forms [7, 8, 11, 16, 20, 23–25]. The 
level of trust in a community is related to the level of social 
capital in the community and also depends on the level of 
homogeneity. Trust reduces the investment and governance 
problems associated with cooperatives. 
 
What type of CMG might be most appropriate? 
The choice of structure and function for a CMG in a develop-
ing country depends on the level of trust and comparative 
advantage, but it will also depend on other external and inter-
nal prerequisites. Because many external prerequisites such 
as input and information supplies, transport, storage, process-
ing and other factors of production are missing or in short 
supply, there is pressure for the CMG to take over these func-
tions [22]. However, since many communities in developing 
countries have low levels of education and management ex-
pertise, they are at a disadvantage in trying to operate com-
plex, multi-enterprise businesses. In addition, increased com-
plexity amplifies the investment and governance problems 
which appear to be a major cause of cooperative failure in 
both developed and developing countries. The guiding princi-
ple would appear to be to keep it simple and focussed. 
 
The type of comparative advantage provided by the CMG will 
also be important in determining the structure and function of 
the cooperative. In situations where there are economies of 
size from processing and the likelihood of monopsony pric-
ing, then a processing cooperative may be appropriate. How-
ever, a range of other factors are also important to success 
including establishing a successful market strategy, optimum 
design, professional management and pump priming. Organi-
sations of this type require substantial capital and expertise in 
their design and operations, and consequently are unlikely to 
be appropriate without long-term commitment by government 
or a non governmental organisation (NGO). 
 
In situations of competitive markets, where market failures 
arise because the existing marketing system does not provide 
a premium price for small farmers producing differentiated 
products, there may be an opportunity for a BC. These may 
range from small cluster bargaining groups [7] to larger GAs 
[4] and BCs [36]. In this situation, the capital and organisa-
tional costs are much smaller because the role of the CMG is 
limited as it does not buy or undertake any secondary proc-
essing, although it may extend to quality control, sorting and 
packaging. Through consolidating product, focussing on 
quality and negotiating a fair price, such cooperative groups 
can provide an opportunity for smallholders to participate in 
higher-priced markets. 
 
BCs can also be used to negotiate prices with monopsony 
buyers or processors [36], but the ability of farmers to do this 
will depend on whether this is illegal, on whether there is 
legislation to facilitate this process and just as importantly, 
whether farmers will receive political and legal protection 
from intimidation from powerful vested interests. Agricul-
tural bargaining legislation may provide welfare gains pro-
vided there is not a high level of grower heterogeneity [36]. 
By securing a market for their product and providing price 
advantages for their members, BCs have the potential to in-
crease trust and confidence in group marketing [37]. This 
could be a first step in creating an expanded CMG which 
extends into downstream processing in situations where 
economies of scale and monopsony pricing exist. 
 
Conversely, it appears that CMGs are unlikely to be sustain-
able in developing countries where: they have been estab-
lished to implement government programs or receive govern-
ment subsidies; grass roots participation is lacking; a depend-
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ency relationship is established; there is political interference 
in their operations; and the size of the cooperative grows so 
that there is considerable diversity in its operations and het-
erogeneity in its membership.  
 
Directions for future research 
Much of the research in this review comes from peer-reviewed 
journals and internet sources which is a limitation for an inves-
tigation of CMGs in developing countries, since much of the 
work in these countries is at the applied level, and if published, 
is mostly only available in obscure reports or at best in confer-
ence proceedings. Consequently, a considerable proportion of 
the literature comes from developed countries. However, de-
spite the differences, it is probably fair to say that if, under 
certain circumstances, a CMG is likely to struggle to succeed 
in a developed country it will be even less likely to succeed in 
a developing country. 
 
The comparison between the performance of Fairtrade coop-
eratives in Africa and South America as discussed in  
this review is indicative of the benefits to be gained by  
undertaking case studies of similar cooperatives in different 
parts of the developing world. This review has tried to  
develop a list of essential and performance enhancing factors 
to provide guidance for practitioners facilitating the establish-
ment of CMGs and hypotheses for researchers investigating 
factors leading to their success. More detailed qualitative and 
quantitative work is required to delineate which of the factors 
are essential and the relative importance of the performance 
enhancing factors. Similarly, further work is required on the 
roles and processes that facilitating organisations should use in 
helping small farmers establish collaborative groups. There 
may be a fine line between “pump priming” and “pumping” 
with the former enabling the group to become self supporting 
and the latter creating a dependency. 
 
It appears that small homogeneous cooperatives have some 
chance of success, but problems arise when hierarchies of co-
operatives are created. Further investigation is required on how 
to structure these hierarchies so they maintain grower loyalty 
and provide efficient service to their members. Similarly, in 
situations where farmers face a number of market failures that 
constrain their operations, we need to investigate how best to 
structure cooperatives to provide a range of services without 
them succumbing to investment and governance problems. 
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